We introduce a simple one-parameter game derived from a model describing the properties of a directed polymer in a random medium. At his turn, each of the two players picks a move among two alternatives in order to maximize his final score, and minimize opponent's return. For a game of length n, we find that the probability distribution of the final score Sn develops a traveling wave form, Prob(Sn = m) = f (m − v n), with the wave profile f (z) unusually decaying as a double exponential for large positive and negative z. In addition, as the only parameter in the game is varied, we find a transition where one player is able to get his maximum theoretical score. By extending this model, we suggest that the front velocity v is selected by the nonlinear marginal stability mechanism arising in some traveling wave problems for which the profile decays exponentially, and for which standard traveling wave theory applies. [3, 4, 5] . In physics, it naturally arises when studying thermodynamical properties of disordered systems [6] , and in particular, the distribution of the ground state energy [4, 5] .
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PACS numbers: 02.50.-r, 05.40.-a Extreme value statistics of random variables has been long studied by mathematicians [1, 2] and physicists [3, 4, 5] . In physics, it naturally arises when studying thermodynamical properties of disordered systems [6] , and in particular, the distribution of the ground state energy [4, 5] .
If the considered random variables E 1 , E 2 , ..., E N are uncorrelated, the distribution of E min = min i E i or E max = max i E i becomes universal for large N , once properly scaled [1, 2] . It takes the form of the Gumbel, Fréchet or Weibull distribution depending on the asymptotic properties of the distribution of the E i 's. However, in the case of strongly correlated random variables, there are no general results, and it is usually a formidable task to access to the distribution of E min or E max .
In [4] , the authors study a simple model of a directed polymer on a Cayley tree, inspired from the original work of [6] , but focussing on the ground state properties (i.e. zero temperature). The simplest version of the model is defined on a Cayley tree developed over n generations, and with Z branches originating from each node. The polymer made of n bonds starts from the root node, and for a given path on the tree, the total length of the polymer (assimilated to its energy) is E path = i∈path l i .
(
The elementary lengths l i are quenched random variables associated to each bond of the tree and independently drawn from the same random distribution ρ(l). The hierarchical structure of the Cayley tree induces strong correlations between the different possible energies (or lengths) of the polymer. One is then interested in the distribution of the minimal energy E min , i.e. the ground state energy. Because of these strong correlations, the ground state energy distribution in not expected to fall into one of the three universality classes arising in the case of independent random variables [4, 5] , the best known of them being the Gumbel distribution [1, 2] . In the special case of the binary distribution
the authors of [4] obtained an unbinding transition when p > p c = 1 − Z −1 , where the polymer goes from a finite length to an extensive length E min ∼ v(p)n. In addition, the distribution of E min has a traveling front form
where f (z) decays exponentially fast for large negative argument. This last property and the general theory of traveling waves [7, 8, 9, 10, 11] lead to a simple selection mechanism for the front velocity v(p) (linear marginal stability; see hereafter).
In the present work, we define a game theoretical model, directly inspired by this directed polymer model. Although our model lacks any thermodynamical reference, it is certainly related to other optimization problems, where the notions of extreme value statistics and traveling front arise [3] .
Two players A and B play an alternating game of duration n, with player A starting the game. When it is his turn to play, a player has a choice of Z possible moves. Hence, the map of all possible game histories has the structure of a Cayley tree with Z branches originating from any node, and of length 2n. The i-th move by player A brings him the additional score a i , whereas the next play by player B add the value b i to the score of player A. The score of player B is defined as the opposite of that of player A. The elementary scores a i and b i are quenched random variables independently drawn from the same distribution ρ. Ultimately, the final score of player A is
The goal of player A is to maximize its final score, whereas player B will do his best to select his plays in order to minimize the score of player A, and hence maximizing his own score. The two players have an a priori knowledge of the game tree structure so that the final score of player A is defined as From now, we specialize to the case Z = 2, although our results can be easily extended to any Z. Moreover, we restrain ourselves to the elementary score distribution given by Eq. (2). It should be emphasized that the players do not pick their next play in order just to maximize its local outcome (i.e. A picking its next move among available branches with a i = 1 or B picking the minimum available b i ). If the players were adopting such a simple depth-0 strategy, which would be their natural approach if they did not have the prior knowledge of the a i 's and b i 's distribution over the tree, the final score of player A would be simply the sum of n independent variables of mean p 2 + 2p(1 − p) (A picks a branch with a i = 1, if there is one available), and n variables of mean p 2 (B picks a branch with b i = 0, if there is one available). Then the distribution of S n would be a Gaussian (of width σ ∼ √ n), and mean S n = v 0 (p)n, with
Note that this result is identical to the score velocity obtained if the players had picked their move at random: the depth-0 strategies of both players exactly annihilate. Instead, having a global view of the game tree, the players will try to direct the game into favorable branches for them, in order to maximize their final score, even if they may have sometimes to pick an unfavorable local move (a i = 0 for player A, b i = 1 for player B) in order to achieve their goal. For p > 1/2, there are more bonds with a i = 1 or b i = 1, so that we expect that the objective of player A should be easier to achieve than that of player B. Hence, we anticipate that S n = v(p)n, with
In the opposite case p < 1/2, the above inequality is obviously reversed. In fact, by exchanging the roles of A and B (and neglecting the fact that A starts the game, for large n), it is clear that one has the symmetry relation [4] ,
In addition, one has the trivial constraints,
which are consistent with Eq. (8).
An intermediate strategy to the ones presented above corresponds to players having only a partial view of the game tree up to a finite depth. For instance, if the players have the knowledge of there next available move, and of their opponent's ensuing options, they should adopt the following depth-1 strategy:
• Player A: if the options of player A are equal (both a i = 0 or 1), A picks the branch for which the number of b i equal to 1 (when it will be the turn of B to play) is maximal. If only one branch corresponds to a i = 1, A choses this move.
• Player B: if the options of player B are equal (both b i = 0 or 1), B picks the branch for which the number of a i+1 equal to 1 is minimal. If only one branch corresponds to b i = 0, B picks this move.
After a elementary but cumbersome calculation, we find that the score velocity v 1 (p) corresponding to this depth-1 strategy is given by,
One has v 1 (p) ≥ v 0 (p) for p ≥ 1/2, and v 1 (p) satisfies the symmetry relation of Eq. (8) and the conditions of Eq. (9). For higher but finite strategy depth, an analyt- ical treatment becomes extremely complicated.
Let us now move back to our model, where both players have a global knowledge of the game tree (infinite depth). Obtaining the (not necessarily unique) optimal path realizing both players antagonist goals can be achieved by using the recursive minimax algorithm [12] , which gives a more precise meaning to Eq. (5). Let us assume that we have generated four instances of optimized scores S (k) n (k = 1, 2, 3, 4) on four independent games of length n (with the initial condition S (k) n = 0, for n = 0). In order to construct an optimized score for a game of length n + 1, we first generate two intermediate scores including the previous move of player B (see Fig. 1 ),
Then the final score is obtained by optimizing the first move of player A over his two possible plays, a 1 and a 2 (see Fig. 1 ):
Using Eqs. (11, 12) , we can derive the corresponding recursion relations for the cumulative distribution of S n and R n ,
and starting from the initial condition P n (m) = 1 for m ≥ 0, and P n (m) = 0 for m < 0. Defining q = 1 − p, we find
The intermediate distribution Q n (m) can be eliminated by inserting Eq. (14) into Eq. (15), leading to a single recursion relation between P n+1 and P n . The probability density of S n is defined as
We look for a traveling wave form for P n (m)
with the boundary conditions F (z) → 1, for z → +∞, and F (z) → 0, for z → −∞. The probability density of S n has a similar traveling wave form, associated to the hull function f (z):
Inserting this ansatz into Eqs. (14,15), we find that F satisfies the following functional equation
where we have used the shorthand notation v for v(p). By retaining the leading contributions in Eq. (19) for z → −∞, and for v > 0, we find
which leads to the double exponential asymptotics
where α − > 0 is an unknown p-dependent constant. Similarly, in the opposite limit z → +∞, and assuming v < 2, the functional equation Eq. (19) reduces to
which again leads to a double exponential decay
where α + > 0 is some p-dependent constant. Hence, and contrary to the standard traveling wave theory [3, 4, 5] , where the traveling front exponential decay for z → −∞ or z → +∞ permits the determination of the front velocity, v(p) remains so far undetermined. Here, the double exponential decay obtained on both sides results from the minimax constraint, instead of the usual min (or max ) constraint imposed when considering the ground state energy or the minimum (or maximum) path length distribution [4, 5] . This fast decay of f (z) for z → ±∞ and the traveling wave form of Eq. (18) ensure that 
In the symmetric case p = 1/2, we find that S n = n + σ 0 , where σ 0 = 0.14291695... is a strictly positive constant, illustrating the slight advantage that A gains from starting the game. Let us give a physical explanation for the occurrence of this transition. As p > 1/2 increases, the number of paths along which all the a i 's and b i 's are equal to 1 grows exponentially. Indeed, the probability of having such a path is p 2n , so that their total number in the tree is of order 2 2n ×p 2n . The existence of this transition shows that for p > p c , player A is able to chose his moves in order to force the outcome of the game to follow one of these path, with probability unity, as n → ∞. Symmetrically, for p < 1 − p c , player B will find enough branches along which most a i 's and b i 's are equal to 0, in order to enforce that the front velocity remains zero in this regime, consistently with the symmetry relation of Eq. (8) .
This transition can be understood analytically, by studying the stability of a traveling front of velocity v(p) = 2. Noting that P n (2n) = Q n (2n + 1) = 1 (since S n ≤ 2n and R n ≤ 2n + 1), we consider the dynamics of u n = P n (2n − 1) ≤ 1. From Eqs. (14,15), u n satisfies the recursion relation
with u 0 = 0. u n = P n (2n − 1) = 1 is an obvious fixed point of Eq. (25), corresponding to the case v(p) < 2. If this fixed point is selected, and after linearizing Eq. (25), we find that
which is fully consistent with Eq. (23), with z = 2n − 1 − v(p)n. However, the recursion relation of Eq. (25) has three other fixed points (x − , x + , x 0 ), which can be obtained analytically by solving a third order polynomial equation, leading to cumbersome expressions. A detailed analysis shows that x 0 is always real, with x 0 > 1. This fixed point is unphysical and necessarily unstable. The two other fixed points are real for p ≥ p c (x − < x + ), with
and complex conjugates for p < p c . Moreover, one finds that x − is maximal for p = p c , at which x ± = 1/9.
Finally, a stability analysis shows that x − is the only stable fixed point for p c < p ≤ 1. Hence, we conclude that P n (2n − 1) converges (exponentially fast) to x − for p c < p ≤ 1, and that the distribution of S n is peaked near m = 2n and decays as a double exponential for m ≪ 2n (as given by Eq. (21)), leading to v(p) = 2. The obtained value of p c is in perfect agreement with the numerical results for v(p) plotted on Fig. 2 . Close to p = 1, x − ∼ 9(1 − p) 2 → 0, and up to second order in (1 − p), the distribution of S n is thus given by
Note that if both players adopt a finite depth strategy, this transition does not occur, as illustrated in Fig. 2 in the case of depth-0 and depth-1 strategies considered above. By adopting a short-sighted strategy, player A (respectively B) cannot direct, with probability 1, the sequence of plays to a branch of the tree with a density unity of playing options a i = b i = 1 (respectively a i = b i = 0). Finally, for p below but close to p c , we obtain a very convincing fit of v(p) to the functional form
with c ≈ 0.50(1), leading to an infinite slope for v(p) at p = p − c , as found numerically on Fig. 2 . In fact, for p ≥ 1/2, we find that the simple heuristic functional form
fits the data with a relative accuracy better that 0.1 %, comparable although slightly higher than the estimated numerical error bars of the data. This functional form ensures that v(1/2) = 1 and that the behavior of Eq. (29) is reproduced, and leads to the heuristic values,
in good agreement with the numerical estimates presented above. Let us now address the properties of the hull function f (z), and its cumulative sum F (z). First of all, if for a given p, the corresponding v(p) happens to be a rational number v(p) = α/β (α and β being mutually prime), Eq. (19) implies that the hull function is only defined on the discrete set of fractions of the form k/β. This is in particular the case for p = 1/2 (v(1/2) = 1), p > p c (v(p) = 2), and p < 1 − p c (v(p) = 0). On the other hand, when v(p) is irrational, the set of points of the form z = m − v(p)n is dense on the real axis, and f (z) is a continuous function defined on the real axis. As v(p) approaches v(p c ) = 2 from below, the hull function f (z) develops steps which blend into discontinuities as p → p c . This property is illustrated on Fig. 3 , along with the asymptotics obtained in Eqs. (21,23) .
We now extend our original model in order to gain some insight about the velocity selection mechanism. This is achieved by modifying the model so that the standard theory of front propagation will apply. In this (A, ε)-model, player A always follows its best strategy, while player B follows the depth-0 strategy (picking a branch with b i = 0 if available) with probability ε and its optimal strategy with probability 1 − ε. The original model is hence recovered for ε = 0. The recursion relation of Eq. (14) now becomes
while Eq. (15) remains unchanged. We denote the associated front velocity by v A (p, ε). Note that if B were playing purely randomly, the terms q 2 +2pq and p 2 in Eq. (32) must be replaced respectively by q and p. This model has exactly the same qualitative properties as the (A, ε)-model, on which we hence concentrate, since player B adopts a more intelligent strategy (some results obtained for the random model will be mentioned in passing). In the (B, ε)-model, one exchanges the role of players A and B, and Eq. (15) is changed into
whereas Eq. (14) still holds. When exchanging the role of the two players, the associated front velocity v B (p, ε) satisfies the symmetry relation,
which reduces to Eq. (8), when ε = 0. However, for ε > 0, v A (p, ε) and v B (1 − p, ε) do not obey the symmetry relation of Eq. (8) . In addition, we have the exact inequalities,
since players B and A are respectively playing less optimally in the (A, ε) and (B, ε)-models than in the original model. Because of the symmetry relation of Eq. (34), we focus on the (A, ε)-model, and denote the associated velocity simply by v. The (A, ε)-model main interest lies in the fact that for ε > 0,P n (m) = 1 − P n (m) decays exponentially for m ≫ vn, so that the standard mechanisms of front velocity selection do apply (see below). When P n (m) ≪ 1, the recursions of Eqs. (15,32) indeed lead tō
or equivalently, the front profileF (z) = 1 − F (z) satisfies
to be compared to Eq. (22), for the original model. The simple ansatzF (z) ∼ exp(−λz) leads to the dispersion relation
where the decay rate λ is so far undetermined. Let us now summarize the main known mechanisms of velocity front selection [7, 8, 9, 10, 11] for exponentially fast decaying profiles. In many physical cases, including those studied in [4, 5] , a linear marginal stability (LMS) argument shows that the selected front velocity corresponds to the minimum velocity v min allowed by the dispersion relation v(λ), associated to the decay rate λ min . However, in some other cases [9, 10, 11] , a bigger velocity is selected by a nonlinear marginal stability (NLMS) mechanism. Without entering into too much details, let us briefly explicit this point. Consider the large z asymptotics of a solution of the full nonlinear problem associated to the velocity v,
with λ 1 (v) < λ min given by the dispersion relation derived from linear analysis. Note that the above linear analysis does not grant access to A 1 (v), not to mention the correction term proportional to A 2 (v). Now, if there exists a velocity v * > v min for which A 1 (v * ) = 0, F (z) will decay more sharply with rate λ 2 (v * ), which is necessarily another root of the dispersion relation, with λ 2 (v * ) > λ min . It can be shown that all traveling fronts with velocity less than v * are then unstable against invasion by a profile of velocity v * , which leads to the selection of the velocity front v * , instead of v min [9, 10, 11] . In practice, there are very few examples for which the transition between a linear and a nonlinear marginal stability scenario can be analytically identified, since it requires in general a full solution of the profile associated to a velocity v, in order to obtain A 1 (v). To the knowledge of the author, all such tractable examples concern traveling front in the spatial and temporal continuum [9, 10, 11] , like for instance,
for κ ≥ 1. In this case [9, 11] , v(λ) = λ + λ −1 , so that v min = 2 and λ min = 1. v min is selected for 1 ≤ κ ≤ 2, whereas v = v * = (κ/2) 1/2 + (κ/2) −1/2 (with λ 1 = (κ/2) −1/2 and λ 2 = (κ/2) 1/2 ), for κ > 2. Returning to our (A, ε)-model, we find that a non trivial v min exists for any ε > 1/2. It is obtained by first finding λ min , the unique real positive solution of
and setting v min = v(λ min ) in Eq. (38). In particular, we find that v min = 2, for p > p c , with
In the case ε = 1, when player B always adopts the depth-0 strategy, we find p c = 2 −1/3 = 0.7937005... Hence, we obtain the same kind of transition as in the original model, where player A is able to get its maximum theoretical score. However, since B has a short-sighted strategy, we do not observe a transition to v = 0 for small but non zero p, as obtained in the original model for p = 1 − p c . We actually find v min ∼ − ln(2ε) ln(p) , when p → 0. Note that if B plays randomly instead of adopting the depth-0 strategy, we obtain the dispersion relation
and p c = (2ε) −1/2 . However, for a given p, we find numerically that the velocity given by the LMS mechanism v min is only selected for ε ≥ ε c (p), so that the results of Eqs. (38,41,42) are only valid for ε close enough to 1. For 1/2 < ε < ε c (p) < 1, and although a non trivial v min does exist, we find v > v min . This strongly suggests the relevance of the NLMS mechanism in this case. Unfortunately, for 1/2 < ε < ε c (p) and a given v, there is very little hope to obtain an analytical solution of the corresponding full nonlinear equation for F (z), in order to apply the NLMS criterion explained above. Likewise, for ε < 1/2, the minimal positive velocity is v min = 0 (v(λ = 0) = −∞), and the prospect of an analytical solution appears even bleaker. Note however that v and the associated decay rate λ are still related by the dispersion relation of Eq. (38).
On the bright side, the full line p c (ε) can be determined exactly, by studying the dynamics of u n = 1−P n (2n−1), in the same spirit as in the case ε = 0. We find that u n satisfies the exact recursion relation
with u 0 = 1. We then determine the value of p c (ε) above which there exists a stable non trivial fixed point u * (ε) = 0. For ε ≥ 4/5, we find that p c (ε) is indeed given by the LMS argument, leading to the result of Eq. (42). On the other hand, for 0 ≤ ε < 4/5, a regime were the NLMS mechanism should be relevant, p c (ε) and u * (ε) are determined in the same spirit as in the case ε = 0, by imposing that
which goes smoothly to the result of Eq. (27), when ε → 0. Interestingly, this analysis provides the exact value of ε c for the corresponding value of p = p c (ε c ) = (2ε c ) −1/3 , at the transition between the LMS and NLMS regimes. We thus find In Fig 4, we plot our exact result for p c (ε) and a numerical estimate of ε c (p), the boundary between the LMS and NLMS domains of application. In Fig 5, we plot v A (p, ε) and v B (p, ε) for ε = 1, where B and A are respectively adopting the depth-0 strategy, for ε = 4/5, the smallest ε for which the LMS mechanism applies for all p, and for ε = 1/4, for which the NLMS mechanism holds for all p. We observe numerically that v A (p, ε) and v B (p, ε) converge smoothly to v(p) as ε → 0.
Let us finally address the subleading corrections to the average score S n . The LMS mechanism implies [7, 10 ] that S n = v min n − 3 2λ min ln n + ...
In the (ε, p) regime where the LMS mechanism applies, we have confirmed numerically the occurrence of this logarithmic correction, as well as its magnitude. In the NLMS regime, we find instead that the next correction to S n = vn is constant. Quite generally, this result can be justified analytically whenever v > v min , in particular when the NLMS mechanism applies [13] . This property was exploited in order to obtain the numerical estimate of ε c (p) shown in Fig 4 , and this criterion is found to be fully consistent with defining ε c (p) as the value of ε for which v becomes equal to the velocity v min selected by the LMS mechanism (see Eqs. (38,41,42)).
In the present work, we have defined a simple twoplayer game inspired by a model of directed polymer on the Cayley tree. The fact that the two players have antagonist goals is reminiscent of the notion of frustration quite common in disordered physical systems. In our model, this frustration originates from the minimax constraint, which is, however, quite uncommon in physics. As a consequence, the present model has no thermodynamical interpretation. We found that the score distribution develops a traveling wave form, with the hull function unusually decaying superexponentially for large negative and positive arguments. We have justified analytically the occurrence of a transition, across which a player can obtain his maximum theoretical score, whatever the strategy of the other player. Contrary to systems for which the standard traveling wave theory applies, we did not succeed in understanding analytically the process which leads to the selection of the velocity front. However, after studying an extension of the original model, we strongly suggest that the selection mechanism is related to nonlinear marginal stability, arising in some traveling wave problems for which the profile decays exponentially.
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